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In “Cana of Galilee,” the culminating chapter of Book Seven of The 
Brothers Karamazov, Alesha stumbles upon the solution to the mystery of 
miracles. His mentor, Father Zosima, has just died. Not long before that, 
Alesha had listened to his brother Ivan’s harangue on the fundamental 
paradoxes, therefore fallacies, of Christian faith. Among them is that 
Jesus allegedly asked his followers to believe in him in the absence of 
material proof of his divinity, while knowing all the time that his 
followers lacked the strength of will to do such a thing. This was the 
message that Ivan’s Inquisitor delivered to the Savior himself by telling 
him that he (the Savior) had made the wrong choices in response to the 
Devil’s temptations. Those temptations, after all, were designed to trick 
Jesus into offering his prospective disciples miracles, which is to say, 
material proof of his divinity. 
The monks are keeping vigil over Zosima’s dead body, and Father 
Paissy is reading from the Gospels. Alesha tries to pray, but his mind 
wanders off to other thoughts. Then he begins to pay attention to the 
Gospel passage that Father Paissy is reading. By astonishing chance, it’s 
the one from John, chapter 2, telling the story of the wedding in Cana of 
Galilee, where Jesus turned the water into wine. With Ivan’s words 
resonating in his head, Alesha must have been putting to himself now for 
quite a few hours the obvious question: if miracles deprive us of our 
freedom, then why did Jesus perform any miracles, let alone the many 
that are recounted in the Gospels? In a deft use of montage and interior 
monologue, Dostoevsky takes us back and forth between Alesha’s 
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thoughts and the Gospel passage. Because we’re in a monastery, the 
Gospel is being read in Old Church Slavonic. Dostoevsky reproduces the 
passage from John word for word in the archaic language, skipping only 
the inconsequential verse 6 (presumably because Alesha is thinking other 
thoughts during its recitation). But after only the third verse (“When the 
wine gave out, the mother of Jesus said to him, ‘They have no wine’”), 
Alesha had already said this to himself: “It was not the grief but the joy of 
the people that Christ visited; performing for the first time a miracle, he 
helped the joy of the people.”1 Here clearly is the answer to the burning 
question. If Jesus had performed the miracle in order to visit the people’s 
grief, what would the source of that grief have been? No doubt it would 
have been the people’s want of faith, and the purpose of the miracle 
would have been to restore that faith or even inspire it for the first time. 
Alesha’s thoughts finally turn into a dream, in which Father Zosima 
himself approaches his novice and confirms the interpretation that Jesus 
turned the water into wine “so that the joy of the guests should not be cut 
short.”2 Father Zosima, in fact, continues the Gospel story where it had 
left off, describing Jesus, in a departure from the text, as he invites yet 
more guests “forever and ever” and has yet more wine served. Everything 
is now tidy in Alesha’s mind, so that when he wakes up from this dream 
he no longer listens to what’s being read. And why should he? Now he’s 
free to water the earth with the tears of his joy and embark on the new life 
his mentor had mandated by commanding him “to dwell in the world.” 
Here’s the passage after which Alesha stopped listening—and after 
which Dostoevsky reproduces no further verses: “When the steward 
tasted the water that had become wine, and did not know where it came 
from, the steward called the bridegroom and said to him, ‘Everyone 
serves the good wine first, and then the inferior wine after the guests have 
become drunk. But you have kept the good wine until now.’” But surely 
Alesha must have known that these lines, verses 9 and 10, are not the end 
of the wedding story. The story includes a natural conclusion in verse 11, 
consisting in a comment that tells the meaning of the story before the next 
story (the one about chasing the moneylenders out of the Temple) begins 
in verse 12. The comment is slightly ambiguous in English translation 
because of the nature of English verbs. It is not, however, ambiguous 
either in the original Greek or in Russian. Here is verse 11 in Greek: 
                                                 
1 PSS, 14:326 
2 PSS, 14:327 
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Tautēn epoiēsen arkhēn tōn sēmeiōn ho Iēsous en Kana tēs Galilaias kai 
ephanerōsen tēn doxan autou kai episteusan eis auton hoi mathētai autou. 
Literal translation: 
This beginning of the signs [miracles] Jesus did [made] in Cana of Galilee, and 
[he] showed forth his glory, and his disciples believed in him. 
The sentence contains three verbs, connected by kai (“and”): epoiēsen 
(“made,” “did”), ephanerōsen (“showed forth”), and episteusan (“be-
lieved”). These are all aorist verbs, which means that, like perfective 
verbs in Russian, they describe a sequence of mutually discrete actions 
that occurred in time in the same order as the verbs occur in the text: 
Jesus did, then Jesus showed forth, and then Jesus’ disciples believed. The 
final verb is the critical one here. Its action follows that of the second, just 
as the action of the second verb follows that of the first. Though there is 
no explicit indication of causality (for instance, a word or phrase meaning 
“therefore,” “thus,” “as a consequence”), there is no other way to under-
stand this story than that (1) Jesus performed his miracle, (2) he thereby 
showed forth his glory, and, (3) as a consequence, his disciples believed 
in him, meaning that they commenced believing once he had shown forth 
his glory. 
The modern Russian version of the Gospel that Dostoevsky read 
conveys the same logic. 
Сие начало чудесам положил Иисус в Кане Галилейской, и явил славу 
свою; и уверовали в Него ученики Его. 
Literal translation: 
This beginning to the miracles Jesus instituted in Cana of Galilee, and revealed 
[was revealing] his glory; and His disciples came to believe [started believing] 
in Him. 
Though явил is not a perfective verb, положил and уверовали are, so 
there is clearly a sequence of actions. But even without a clear series of 
three perfective verbs, уверовали makes the case as clear as can be, 
because it explicitly signifies the initiation of belief. To judge from what’s 
written in verse 11, the disciples started to believe only after Jesus had 
performed the miracle and after he had revealed (or while he was 
revealing) his glory. Now, to be sure, there is no indication in the 
wedding story that the disciples were asking for a miracle or that they had 
struck a bargain with Jesus: turn this water into wine, or we won’t believe 
in you. But the temporal and hence the causal sequence is as clear as day. 
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Why did Dostoevsky (not Alesha) omit verse 11? Because it is one of 
the clearest refutations the Gospels offer to a central claim of the Grand 
Inquisitor. When he reproaches Jesus for failing to accept the temptations 
of the devil, the Grand Inquisitor gives his own explanation of Jesus’ 
motives. Jesus refused to turn the stones into bread and refused to cast 
himself off the tower because to have carried out either of these actions 
would have been to deny the freedom of his prospective followers. The 
Inquisitor says it again and again. “But you did not want to deprive man 
of freedom and rejected the [devil’s] proposition, for what sort of freedom 
is it, you reasoned, if obedience is purchased with bread?”3 He expresses 
his theory about freedom and miracles—that is, about how the two, as he 
sees it, are connected in the mind of Jesus—most explicitly with a 
reference not to the temptations but to the story of the passersby who 
taunted Jesus on the cross: “You did not come down from the cross when 
they were yelling at you, mocking and teasing you, ‘Come down from the 
cross, and we will come to believe that it is you.’ You did not come 
down, because, again, you did not want to enslave man with a miracle and 
thirsted for free, not miraculous, faith. You thirsted for free love, not the 
servile raptures of the slave in the presence of a power that has once and 
for all terrified him.”4  
The story of the taunting occurs in Matthew 27. Here is what the 
passersby really say, in the modern Russian translation that Dostoevsky 
read: 
есть-ли Ты Сын Божий, сойди со Креста.5 
In the New Revised Standard Version: 
If you are the Son of God, come down from the cross. 
Here are the words that Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor puts in the mouths 
of the taunters: 
Сойди со креста и уверуем, что это ты. 
The Grand Inquisitor explicitly uses the perfective уверовать (come to 
believe or start to believe), placing it in its sequential and causal 
relationship with the preceding perfective verb, сойти, to highlight the 
conditional nature of the faith that, in his view, is the best that most of us 
are capable of. Unable to bear the burden of the freedom that Christ 
                                                 
3 PSS, 14:230 
4 PSS, 14:233 
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allegedly wishes to place on their shoulders, people demand proof in the 
form of a miracle as a precondition of their belief. The Grand Inquisitor 
attributes both a response and a motive to Jesus in this story: Jesus refuses 
to come down (or simply does not come down), because he does not wish 
to enslave men. But of course in the Gospel story, nothing of the sort ever 
happens. Jesus doesn’t say a word in response to his tormentors. The first 
words out of his mouth after these insults, in fact, come hours later, in 
response not to the taunts of the rabble but to the terrible ordeal he is 
undergoing. They are the famous words in Aramaic, quoted from the 
twenty-second Psalm: “Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?” (as spelled in the 
New Revised Standard Version), “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?”6 As best we can tell from the actual text in Matthew, Jesus 
is oblivious to the words and actions of his tormentors. 
What’s going on here? The Grand Inquisitor has retold the story of 
the crucifixion, complete with Jesus’ affirmation of freely chosen faith, 
by using as a negative example his own purposefully modified account of 
what the rabble is thinking (we’ll start believing on condition that you 
come down from the cross) and what Jesus is thinking (if I come down 
from the cross and, as a consequence, they start to believe, I will have 
taken away their freedom). In its account of what the rabble is thinking 
(not in its account of what Jesus is thinking), however, this modified 
version is fully consistent with the actual story we read in John (not the 
carefully doctored version that Dostoevsky gives us) about the wedding in 
Cana: the guests commence believing after—and presumably because 
of—the miracle that Jesus has performed. The verb уверовать, highly 
charged because it denotes the initiation of faith and because, placed in 
sequence after a verb denoting an action other than the exercise of free 
choice, it suggests the possibility of faith that arises out of the witnessing 
of a miracle (and thus that is conditioned on that miracle), is what unites 
the Grand Inquisitor’s revisionist reading of Matthew 27:40 with the text 
of John 2:11. 
But Dostoevsky suppressed the actual text of John 2:11. His favorite 
Gospelist apparently agreed with the Grand Inquisitor that, at least some 
of the time (if not most of the time), prospective disciples of Jesus 
actually did commence believing in him only once they’d seen with their 
own eyes proof (or what they regarded as proof) of his divinity. 
The story of the wedding in Cana is not the only example. The 
Gospels contain accounts of several dozen miracles (the exact number 
                                                 
6 Matthew 27:46 
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varies, depending on how you count and depending on what qualifies as a 
miracle). Most of these accounts leave in doubt (or simply do not 
comment on) any connection between the miracle that Jesus has per-
formed and the faith of those who witnessed it. But as it happens, many of 
the passages that show a clear connection occur in John. I’ll give two 
examples. 
In John 4, we read about an official from Capernaum, near Cana in 
Galilee, who came to Jesus and begged him to cure his ailing son. Jesus 
says, “Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe.” He then 
assures the official that his son has already survived. The official, on his 
way back home, hears from his servants that his son has recovered and 
realizes that the recovery occurred exactly at the time that Jesus had 
spoken to him. We read this: “The father realized that this was the hour 
when Jesus had said to him, ‘Your son lives’ [or ‘is alive’—I’ve corrected 
this from the erroneous ‘Your son will live’ in the New Revised Standard 
Version]. So he himself believed, along with his whole household.  Now 
this was the second sign that Jesus did after coming from Judea to 
Galilee” (John 4:53-54). In Dostoevsky’s modern Russian version, we 
find the same verb as in the story of the wedding: уверовать. 
Из сего отец узнал, что это случилось в тот самый час, в который Иисус 
сказал ему: сын твой здоров. И уверовал сам и весь дом его. 
Once again, there is a temporal and causal connection between, first, the 
act of witnessing—or of learning of (узнал)—a miracle and, second, the 
initiation of belief (уверовал). 
Perhaps the clearest indication that John saw a causal connection 
between miracles and the initiation of faith comes at the end of chapter 
20, the next-to-last in his Gospel. The passage, surprisingly, follows 
immediately upon Jesus’ proclaiming to his doubting disciple Thomas, 
“Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have come to believe.”7 
Dostoevsky wrote one of his many marginal “NB”s next to this passage in 
his copy of the New Testament.8 What the Gospelist adds after this 
declaration, however, appears to contradict it: 
Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not 
written in this book. But these are written so that you may come to believe that 
                                                 
7 John 20:29 
8 Geir Kjetsaa, Dostoevsky and His New Testament (Oslo: Solum Forlage, 1984), pp. 42-
43. 
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Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have 
life in his name.9 
Here it is in Dostoevsky’s modern Russian version: 
Много сотворил Иисус пред учениками своими и других чудес, о которых 
не написано в книге сей. Сие же написано, дабы вы уверовали, что Иисус 
есть Христос, Сын Божий, и дабы веруя, имели жизнь во имя Его. 
A moment ago I characterized the connection between free will and the 
initiation of faith as an idea belonging to the Grand Inquisitor, in the 
sense that, in the story, the Inquisitor attributes this connection to Jesus. 
But of course what we’re really talking about here is a central assumption 
that the author, Dostoevsky himself, appears to have made about the way 
faith functions in Christianity. I’m not speaking about what form of faith 
Dostoevsky himself might have embraced, and I’m certainly not 
attributing to him the motive of attempting to convert the misguided to a 
“proper,” Orthodox form of Christianity. I’m speaking purely about an 
intellectual construct that Dostoevsky, like his character Ivan, appears to 
have formed about a fundamental concept in Christianity. Ivan and “his” 
fictional character the Grand Inquisitor see the requirement of free choice 
before faith as one of Christianity’s great flaws, because the vast majority 
of human beings are not capable of sustaining the burden of the volition 
on which that free choice is based. 
Dostoevsky himself probably agreed with this view at odd moments 
of his life (those moments when he wasn’t agreeing with the opposite). 
But his possibly agreeing or disagreeing with it (or doing a little of both) 
is not the issue. What matters is that he has set forth as an untested 
assumption about Christianity that this requirement exists. Faith must rest 
on free choice, or it’s not legitimate faith. Maybe you yourself don’t have 
faith or don’t ever care even to try to have faith. Maybe you think you 
have faith while still hoping for a miracle to substantiate that faith. Maybe 
you think you’ve actually witnessed a miracle, and you then began to 
believe only as a consequence. Or maybe you agree with Ivan and the 
Grand Inquisitor that, with the requirement of freedom, true faith is 
simply ideal and therefore unrealizable. None of this matters. Dostoevsky 
has given us the assumption, if only as a dispassionate, scholarly, factual 
characterization of the way Christianity works. 
The problem is that it’s nonsense, and for at least two reasons. 
                                                 
9 John 20:30-31 
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First, the Scriptures simply don’t bear out the assumption. True, Jesus 
reproaches Thomas for needing to see before he believes, but nowhere in 
the Gospels or elsewhere in the New Testament is there a global assertion 
that those who believe only after seeing have violated one of Jesus’ core 
tenets. Why would Jesus perform miracles at all if that were true, and 
why, as in the case of the official in Capernaum and in the case of 
Thomas himself, would he perform such miracles expressly so as to 
provoke belief? 
A second reason is that what Dostoevsky seems to understand by 
“freedom” is flatly anachronistic in connection with the Gospel stories. 
To be sure, it’s no easy task to characterize Dostoevsky’s conception of 
freedom. As it appears in the central books of The Brothers Karamazov, 
freedom always needs to be defined partly by the tension in which it 
exists with something else and partly by an implicit notion of the 
individual self. Freedom doesn’t get to be freedom unless it asserts itself 
either in the face of an opposing force or in the absence of a supporting 
force. You must freely choose your faith precisely either when experience 
yields up to you what would appear to be clear evidence of an unbridge-
able chasm between God’s justice and the real, secular world or when 
experience simply yields up no evidence to support your faith. Turkish 
soldiers murder babies before the eyes of the babies’ mothers, and yet I 
will believe. The man who claims to be the Son of God, though he should 
be capable of turning stones into bread, won’t, and yet I will believe he is 
the Son of God and will follow him. 
What’s more, this free choice must originate in me. That means it 
comes not even from God himself. It means that I was formed as an 
individual with the power to initiate all my actions and thoughts entirely 
from within myself. To complicate matters further, Dostoevsky’s charac-
ters continue to remind us that the free will with these powers might very 
well be purely an ideal, therefore something that none of us truly 
possesses. But then Dostoevsky’s world is filled with ideals of this sort. 
Bishop Tikhon doesn’t believe “perfectly,” and so he can’t move a 
mountain as a reward for his faith in God.10 But as Jesus explains in 
Matthew 17:20, all it takes to move a mountain is faith “the size of a 
mustard seed.” And Dostoevsky himself, at the bier of his first wife, 
famously declared what he has Ivan declare, namely that loving your 
neighbor as yourself is an impossibility11. That’s because the author 
understands Christ-like love, as expressed in the commandment, to be an 
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absolute ideal, one that implies the dissolution of the self. There is no 
more scriptural basis for this notion than there is for the notion that faith 
must be based on free will or for the notion that both faith and free will 
are purely ideal qualities. 
It goes without saying that the theologies of specific religious 
traditions over the centuries have shown innumerable departures from 
what we might take to be the literal meaning of Scripture—not to mention 
that there is no absolute way to establish a correct version of “the literal 
meaning of Scripture.” But to my way of seeing things, Dostoevsky has 
shown again and again (a) that somewhere along the line he adopted a 
philosophical worldview that was deeply idealist, without being 
specifically Christian, (b) that when he turned his attention to Russian 
Orthodox Christianity—or Christianity in general, for that matter—he 
carried a set of assumptions that were fully consonant with this idealist 
worldview, and (c) that he uncritically attributed these assumptions to 
Christianity. After all, in Ivan’s rebellion, the ideality of neighborly love, 
the intrinsic innocence of children, and the origin of faith in free will are 
never even open for discussion; they have the status of a priori postulates. 
If any one of them is false, his entire system (the one that, in his view, 
challenges Christianity) crumbles into dust. But the possibility that any 
one of them is false is not open for discussion either. Ivan reckons that 
anyone will at least agree with the postulates. The only matter that is open 
to discussion is what to do with a religious system that has been 
constructed on a foundation composed of these postulates. The answer, of 
course, is the debate between Ivan’s Euclidean understanding (the 
empirical cosmology that can’t recognize the existence of ideals) and 
Father Zosima’s own spongy idealism, in which miracle and mystery are, 
well, pretty much the same thing and the inscrutability of God’s justice is 
something to be celebrated. 
But of course, we’re really given no choice at all, because in the end 
Zosima’s idealism degenerates into earth-worship (how much less ideal 
can you get than that?), and Ivan’s critique is based on completely 
fallacious assumptions about Christian faith. No wonder the topic of 
religion was such a source of agony and turmoil to Dostoevsky himself 
and to the characters he created. 
